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wo leaders in the global ﬁ  ght 
against HIV/AIDS—Richard 
Feachem, Executive Director 
of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and 
Peter Piot, Executive Director of the 
Joint United Nations Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)—have 
recently argued that HIV represents 
an extraordinary national security 
threat [1,2]. Their intent has been to 
appeal to the material and strategic 
interests of states in order to increase 
high-level commitment to the ﬁ  ght 
against HIV/AIDS. While increased 
engagement by political leaders is 
clearly welcome, a public health 
perspective on the linkage between 
public health and national security 
has so far been missing. The beneﬁ  ts 
and dangers of justifying efforts to 
address the pandemic in terms of 
its impact on national security are 
underappreciated. 
    Despite the high-proﬁ  le linking of 
HIV/AIDS and security, including 
four United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) meetings and prominent 
mention within the United States 
national security strategy, critical 
debate about the ways in which public 
health interacts with the security 
interests of states are scarce in 
public health journals. Journals have 
examined the ways national security 
issues, including the recent war in Iraq 
and the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂ  ict 
[3,4], have negatively affected public 
health. However, the ways public health 
affects national security interests have 
rarely been considered. It is essential 
to examine this debate, including 
evidence for the links between HIV/
AIDS and national security, from a 
public health perspective because of 
the implications this linkage has for the 
direction and funding of global HIV/
AIDS efforts. 
    This paper argues for greater 
understanding and analysis of the 
public health–national security nexus 
to ensure this linkage beneﬁ  ts the 
ﬁ  ght against HIV/AIDS. Successfully 
negotiating this nexus is essential 
because the humanitarian objectives of 
global health do not ﬁ  t easily into the 
state-centered perspective of national 
security. Global health works to 
improve the health of all people within 
and across states, while the national 
security ﬁ  eld works to protect the 
people, property, and interests of only 
one state. This article will present the 
unique national security perspective on 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic and evidence 
on the links between HIV/AIDS and 
national security, and will evaluate the 
risks and beneﬁ  ts of addressing HIV/
AIDS as a national security issue.
    The National Security Perspective 
on the HIV/AIDS Pandemic
    National security is traditionally deﬁ  ned 
as the protection of a state’s territory, 
population, and interests against 
external threats. While recognizing 
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the humanitarian dimensions of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, national security 
analyses rely on the human impacts 
of the disease to be large enough 
to affect the military, political, and 
economic interests of a state. For 
example, a partially declassiﬁ  ed US 
National Intelligence Council estimate 
argues that infectious diseases threaten 
American national security because 
they will “endanger US citizens at home 
and abroad, threaten US armed forces 
deployed overseas, and exacerbate 
social and political instability in key 
countries and regions in which the 
United States has signiﬁ  cant interests” 
[5]. This focus on strategic interests 
within national security thinking 
partially explains why other global 
health problems of comparably 
high morbidity and mortality, such 
as noncommunicable diseases, are 
not currently considered threats to 
national security. The effects of these 
global health problems are not seen 
to signiﬁ  cantly impact the strategic 
interests of powerful states. 
    Three main arguments linking HIV/
AIDS and national security emerge 
from the security community’s analyses 
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The ﬁ  rst 
describes the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
individuals critical to the maintenance 
of state and international security: 
soldiers and peacekeepers. The second 
argument suggests that the epidemic in 
some sub-Saharan African nations may 
cause state instability and failure. The 
third argument focuses on the security 
effects of the worsening pandemic on 
the large, strategically important states 
of Russia, India, and China (see Figure 
1). The evidence for each of these 
arguments is considered in turn.
    The Impact of HIV/AIDS 
on Strategically Important 
Populations
      Soldiers.   HIV/AIDS is severely affecting 
the armed forces of many countries. 
Accurate data on prevalence of HIV 
among soldiers is difﬁ  cult to obtain 
because affected states either do not 
collect or do not want HIV prevalence 
data published. In 1998, UNAIDS 
estimated that sexually transmitted 
disease “rates among armed forces 
are generally 2 to 5 times higher than 
in civilian populations” [6]. Recent 
estimates are more conservative and 
suggest that HIV prevalence among 
armed forces is equal to or slightly 
greater than civilian rates from the 
same country [7]. Despite the lack of 
reliable data, there is evidence that the 
disease is affecting African militaries. 
Ugboga Nwokoji and Ademola Ajuwon 
state that “AIDS is now the leading 
cause of death in military and police 
forces in some African countries, 
accounting for more than half of in-
service mortality” [8]. The US National 
Intelligence Council estimates that 
“HIV/AIDS probably will complicate 
stafﬁ  ng in the military ofﬁ  cer corps” of 
Nigeria and Ethiopia [5]. 
    However, the impact of HIV/AIDS 
on militaries is not limited to Africa. 
In Russia, 9,000 potential draftees 
have been rejected for service because 
of testing HIV positive in the last 
ﬁ  ve years, with 5,000 rejected in the 
last two years alone (M. Feshbach, 
unpublished data). While China and 
India’s large populations provide 
some insulation against shortages in 
military personnel, these countries 
are increasingly monitoring AIDS in 
their militaries as epidemics in these 
countries spread [5].
    The impact that high HIV prevalence 
will have on the strategic capabilities 
of militaries is complex. Most analysts 
emphasize the negative security 
implications of increasing rates of 
HIV infection in militaries. The loss 
of highly trained, professional soldiers 
to AIDS will have a major impact on 
affected armed forces. Trained soldiers 
are difﬁ  cult and expensive to replace, 
and their absence interrupts the 
training of younger recruits. Armed 
forces that rely wholly or partially on 
conscripts face a decreasing pool of 
healthy recruits as HIV/AIDS continues 
to spread. Russia’s HIV epidemic 
is already exacerbating an existing 
shortage of healthy individuals available 
for military service. It is also argued 
that armed forces with high HIV 
prevalence may incur mounting costs to 
treat soldiers with antiretroviral drugs, 
leading the military to seek greater 
proportions of public expenditure 
while rendering them less able to 
protect national and international 
interests [9,10].
    It is important to note that some 
analyses conﬂ  ate HIV and AIDS, 
assuming all soldiers who are HIV 
positive will not be able to perform 
their duties because of AIDS. Thus, the 
security implications of HIV may be 
less than initially perceived, especially 
for militaries relying on conscription, 
because many soldiers who are HIV 
positive will have completed their duty 
by the time they develop symptoms of 
AIDS. Also, contrary to arguments that 
HIV will worsen national security is the 
idea that higher rates of HIV among 
militaries could have a beneﬁ  cial 
strategic effect by constraining 
“offensive military plans in bellicose 
countries” [9]. Decreased military 
effectiveness may make some countries 
more likely to turn to nonmilitary 
means to resolve conﬂ  icts and promote 
their interests. However, there is no 
available evidence to date that HIV 
has inspired or foreclosed armed 
conﬂ  ict. The strategic impact of high 
HIV prevalence on the armed forces 
remains complex and dependent upon 
other country-speciﬁ  c factors.
      Peacekeepers.   Concern about 
peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS 
while on missions brought the 
pandemic to the attention of the UNSC 
in 2000. Then US Ambassador to the 
UN Richard Holbrooke argued that it 
was a cruel irony to send peacekeepers 
to stop conﬂ  ict only to ﬁ  nd that they 
have unintentionally spread HIV [11]. 
Fears that peacekeepers continue to 
spread HIV have been reinforced by 
recent accusations of sexual abuse 
perpetrated by peacekeepers while 
deployed in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo [12]. While these acts 
may have minimal impact on the 
regional AIDS epidemic, they seriously 
undermine trust in UN peacekeeping 
missions. 
    In addition to peacekeepers 
directly spreading HIV, high rates of 
HIV among the militaries in troop-
contributing countries may make it 
more difﬁ  cult to staff peacekeeping 
missions [9,13]. High rates of HIV 
in the South African and Nigerian 
militaries in particular, which are major 
contributors of peacekeeping troops, 
may imperil African-led responses to 
regional crises such as that in Sudan. 
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Countries may also be less willing to 
contribute personnel for peacekeeping 
operations if soldiers risk returning 
from the mission infected with HIV 
[9]. Among Nigerian peacekeepers 
in Sierra Leone, HIV prevalence 
increased with the length of duty, from 
7% to 10% to 15% over three years 
(A. Adefolalu, unpublished data). If 
peacekeeping tours of duty continue 
to be correlated with increasing HIV 
infections, countries may begin to limit 
the amount of time they commit troops 
to peacekeeping missions. 
    A ﬁ  nal complication is that countries 
may object to hosting peacekeepers 
that come from countries with high 
HIV/AIDS prevalence [9]. In 2001, 
Eritrea unsuccessfully demanded that 
the UNSC prevent troops who were 
HIV positive from being deployed 
in peacekeeping operations on the 
border of Ethiopia and Eritrea [14]. 
Overall, there is growing evidence 
that the HIV/AIDS pandemic poses 
increasing challenges for the conduct 
of peacekeeping operations given 
the spread of HIV by peacekeepers, 
the reduced ability of countries to 
contribute peacekeepers, and the 
decrease in willingness of some 
countries to accept peacekeepers who 
may pose a disease risk to them. 
    The Potential Effect of HIV/AIDS 
on State Stability
    The effect of HIV/AIDS on state 
stability is perhaps the least studied, 
yet also the most feared, potential 
impact of the disease on security. The 
US National Intelligence Council 
argues that high rates of HIV/
AIDS are “likely to have signiﬁ  cant 
economic, social, political, and 
military implications” in certain 
countries [15]. If these implications 
become severe, the AIDS epidemic 
could contribute to state instability.
      Sub-Saharan Africa.   The 
repercussions of HIV affecting state 
stability differ depending upon the 
country and region affected. To 
date, sub-Saharan Africa has been 
the most highly affected region, and 
the pandemic is seen to represent 
a direct national security threat to 
countries in this region [16]. Despite 
life expectancy at birth falling to below 
40 years in nine African nations, and 
2.3 million deaths from AIDS in sub-
Saharan Africa in 2004, there remains 
a lack of evidence directly linking 
HIV/AIDS and state instability [17]. 
Nonetheless, Peter Piot of UNAIDS 
warns, “How can governments function, 
public services operate, agriculture and 
industry thrive, and law enforcement 
and militaries maintain security, when 
they are being stripped of able-bodied 
and skilled women and men” [1]?
    Evidence does exist that suggests 
AIDS is undermining the capacity 
of communities in Southern Africa 
to cope with food crises, producing 
a new variant of famine created by 
AIDS [18]. A number of authors 
argue that the growing number of 
children orphaned by AIDS poses 
signiﬁ  cant risks to stability in highly 
affected states [19,20], warning that 
the epidemic will “produce a huge and 
impoverished orphan cohort unable 
to cope and vulnerable to exploitation 
and radicalization” [5]. However, other 
evidence suggests that, while orphans 
are clearly disadvantaged, most are 
cared for by family members and are 
not turning to crime [21]. Because of 
the epidemic’s gradual impact on the 
state, it may not cause destabilization 
alone, but may add to instability 
in sub-Saharan African countries 
already weakened by poverty and poor 
governance [9].
    The consideration of sub-Saharan 
Africa on the Western security agenda 
is new. Before the events of 9/11, the 
huge human toll of HIV/AIDS in 
sub-Saharan Africa was insufﬁ  cient 
to seriously engage Western security 
communities. The experience of 
9/11, when terrorists attacked the US 
from a safe harbour within the failed 
state of Afghanistan, demonstrated 
the threat that failed states pose to 
powerful countries. The 2002 US 
national security strategy states clearly 
that “America is now threatened less by 
conquering states than we are by failing 
ones” [22]. The 2003 UK Ministry of 
Defence White Paper also prioritizes 
the risk of failed states [23]. While 
the role of HIV/AIDS in state failure 
remains unproven and is likely to be 
indirect, this perceived linkage has 
brought states and regions considered 
“peripheral” to Western security 
interests onto national security agendas.
    The Second Wave in Strategically 
Important States 
    The ﬁ  nal argument linking HIV/AIDS 
and national security has focused on 
more traditional national security 
concerns by arguing that a “second 
wave” of HIV could destabilize powerful 
countries and regions critical to the 
US and, by extension, global strategic 
interests [15,24]. The nations typically 
included in this group are Russia, 
India, and China. These are three of 
the seven declared nuclear states, and 
although the security impacts of HIV/
AIDS may be years away, increased 
instability in any of these countries 
would have major political, economic, 
and military repercussions. 
    Nicholas Eberstadt estimates that 
intermediate-to-severe epidemics in 
Russia, India, and China could account 
for between 193 and 259 million new 
cases of HIV by 2025— more than 
six times the global total of people 
living with HIV/AIDS today [25]. This 
second wave argument has been used 
to pressure these governments to more 
seriously address their growing HIV/
AIDS epidemics by appealing to their 
strategic interests. At the same time, it 
also demonstrates a potential distortion 
of prioritizing—based on perceived 
strategic importance rather than public 
health need. 
    From the perspective of the Russian, 
Indian, and Chinese governments, 
the link between HIV/AIDS and 
security raises internal security 
challenges. India and China have vast 
populations and small HIV epidemics 
as a proportion of the total population, 
making them less vulnerable than 
sub-Saharan Africa to shortages in 
workers and military recruits. Russia 
has rejected individuals who are HIV 
positive from military service since 
2003, compounding its shortage of 
conscripts due to tuberculosis, drug 
use, alcoholism, and age demographics 
(M. Feshbach, unpublished data) 
[26] . The AIDS epidemic in all three 
countries has been driven in signiﬁ  cant 
part by injection drug users along 
heroin trafﬁ  cking routes, and their 
interactions in turn with sex workers 
and the general population [17,27]. 
High HIV infection rates among 
injection drug users and their sexual 
partners in Xinjiang and Yunnan in 
China, and Manipur in India, overlap 
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areas of ethnic minorities, political 
insurgency, and separatist sentiment. 
Xinjiang and Manipur have large 
numbers of Chinese and Indian 
security forces, respectively, who 
are at elevated risk of HIV infection 
through commercial sex with local 
populations. The Russian military faces 
similar, although smaller-scale, risks in 
Chechnya [28,29]. 
    This combination of drug trafﬁ  cking 
and use, commercial sex, and growing 
HIV epidemics in separatist areas are 
major challenges for the Chinese, 
Indian, and Russian governments. 
Programs to prevent and control HIV/
AIDS in these regions may fail due 
to lack of trust, while doing nothing 
may result in further political tensions 
and even accusations of genocide 
[30]. China also faces political and 
economic fallout from HIV infections 
among its blood donors and “ﬂ  oating 
population.” Overall, the links between 
HIV/AIDS and strategically important 
countries and regions have received 
increased attention by Western 
governments and the governments of 
the countries concerned. There remain 
differences, however, in how these links 
are perceived, and the appropriate 
means of addressing the security impact 
of HIV/AIDS.
    The Risks and Beneﬁ  ts of 
Addressing HIV/AIDS as a National 
Security Threat
    The available evidence to date on 
the links between HIV/AIDS and 
security suggests real, and potentially 
signiﬁ  cant, risks to national, regional, 
and global security from the 
pandemic. In sub-Saharan Africa, the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic is already having 
a substantial impact on militaries and 
peacekeepers. In the strategically 
important states of Russia, India, and 
China, HIV/AIDS may contribute to 
medium- to long-term risks of state 
and regional instability. However, far 
more evidence is needed to support 
such claims.
    What is clear is that arguments 
linking HIV/AIDS to national security 
have succeeded in elevating the disease 
to the highest levels of international 
politics, resulting in greater political 
commitment and funding. The chronic 
lack of resources to ﬁ  ght the disease 
and the neglect of the humanitarian 
crisis in sub-Saharan Africa seem to 
justify this strategic appeal to the 
“higher order” values of national 
interests and self-preservation that 
deﬁ  ne the security community.
    Nonetheless, it is also important to 
recognize that there are a number of 
potential risks in adopting a national 
security approach to ﬁ  ght HIV/AIDS. 
Countries classifying information on 
HIV/AIDS in their armed forces as 
national security secrets hinder the 
targeting, operation, and evaluation 
of HIV prevention and treatment 
programs for both soldiers and civilian 
populations that interact with them. A 
primary focus on the national security 
implications of the pandemic could 
cause an inappropriate redirection 
of HIV/AIDS resources toward 
strategically important countries 
or those supportive of the “War 
on Terror.” Conversely, a security 
community could conclude that 
higher rates of HIV/AIDS in certain 
militaries would actually beneﬁ  t its 
own national interests because of a 
reduced ability by affected countries 
to launch offensive attacks. In 
Russia, India, and China, the security 
implications of HIV/AIDS involve 
vulnerable populations such as 
injection drug users, sex workers, and 
ethnic minorities in separatist areas. 
Addressing their health needs using a 
security-based rationale could lead to 
repression or increased stigmatization 
of persons living with HIV/AIDS, both 
counterproductive to effective public 
health practice. Finally, the security 
community seeking to win “hearts 
and minds” through health initiatives 
clouds the traditionally humanitarian 
role of public health and could lead 
to a loss of trust in the motives of 
public health professionals working on 
HIV/AIDS, an issue already fraught 
with sensitivities. The Soviet KGB 
disinformation campaign, suggesting 
that the US deliberately developed 
and spread HIV/AIDS, is an early 
example of the mixing of HIV/AIDS 
and security politics that still haunts 
public health activities today [31,32].
    Successfully negotiating these 
risks is critical to ensuring that the 
public health–national security nexus 
beneﬁ  ts the ﬁ  ght against HIV/AIDS. 
Strengthening the evidence base on the 
links between HIV/AIDS and national 
security is essential. This includes better 
data on the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS 
among soldiers and peacekeepers, 
and the complex relationship between 
the disease and state stability. Equally 
important is the ability of the health 
community to appropriately harness 
the political clout and resources of 
the security community. Foremost is 
the need to demonstrate how proven 
principles and practices in public 
health must be maintained. The 
security community must be convinced 
of their value, notably a human rights–
based approach, to national security 
interests. It is only with this starting 
point that the shared goal of effectively 
tackling the HIV/AIDS pandemic can 
be achieved together.   
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